

# COGNITION IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY. GOVERNANCE OF SYSTEMS AND INFORMATIONAL WARS

**Plamen Atanasov**

***Summary:** Explored is the problem of cognition in the context of the world and the connection with the activity, with which systems (states and societies within them) develop in the context of security. Outlined is the mechanism of communication within the system and between the systems, while as governing tools are defined: censorship, propaganda, and informational warfare. Introduced is the construct of the supra-state subject of governance and an emphasis is placed on the problems associated with its manifestations in the 21st century.*

***Key words:** security, censorship, propaganda, informational wars, supra-state subject of governance.*

## INTRODUCTION

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century the intensity of the social interactions becomes ever more apparent. This circumstance necessitates outlining the problem of relationship between security (both in the wide and in the narrow, institutionally related sense) and the human thought. The present work seeks an answer to this, leaning on the life rule that, in the context of security, the individual's thought is unlikely to possess a purpose, unless it is presented, i.e. discussed, imposed, or refuted by the rest of the crowd. A 'life rule' as humans are social beings and achieving a state of security requires activity. As a result, the security of both the social unity and the individual, as a part of this unity, requires a shared action or inaction, both of which start with the thought about them. The presumption is that the person's thoughts imperatively possess a social content and, as shown below, this necessitates these thoughts "be reflected" in the rest of the members of the social unit. In the context of this clarification, the matter at hand – security – is explored not through thought, but through the objective span of communication, through which people exchange thoughts within the framework of society.

Based on the defined limits, the work develops the hypothesis that: Within the construct of security, outlined becomes the cognitive field whereby the systems, corresponding to the activity of achieving security, construct an image of reality which is sufficiently representative to allow societies and states to "understand" and organise their activity, relative to themselves; to the rest of the reachable systems; and to what is known within the surrounding world as a geographical, psychological, and civilisational term.

The aim of the present work is not simply to outline the necessity of accounting the said cognitive substance, but to outline its evolutionary origin and its social importance. Sought are the mechanisms through which it predefines how the equilibrium, known as security, can be reached. Achieving this equilibrium in practice, for each moment, is sufficient to shape the relationships between the systems.

To the outlined problem is applied a phenomenological approach which connects thought and perception, and passes them through the human cognition. The human knowledge, considered through the prism of contemporary philosophical views: in particular, through its sensuous-rational wholeness and through I. Kant's thought that it starts with human experience (Kanke, 2008, p. 159). The approach is systematically oriented, with the focus being set on the systems in the context of security. They are approached through the views of the Copenhagen school and in particular: as social in their character systems, with a principal building unit being the state and the society within it. (Buzan, Wæver, & Wilde, 1998, pp. 5-6). In a sub-systemic plan, the study reaches to the individual's psyche, while in a super-systemic plan – to the international organisations and even to the cyberspace. To the end of the latter's place in the multitude of the social systems being a peculiar case, in this work the cyberspace is considered through David Clark's Four layer model and thus comprises: a physical layer (hardware and general infrastructure); a logical layer (scripts and protocols); a content layer (the information which is saved and exchanged); and a social layer (the people who participate in the cyberspace) (Clark, 2010).

The focus in the development of the results has been set on informational warfare as a tool for operating in the cognitive dimension of the so-defined systems in the context of security. In relation to this is introduced the understanding of the supra-state subject of governance of systems. To account for the scale of the matter, a non-representative journalistic survey was chosen for developing empirical data. This provides a preliminary assessment of the perspective, presented below, in the context of the practice. In the journalistic survey, from different countries, the chatbot ChatGPT was prompted to generate content on a matter, relevant to states' security.

## **1. SUGGESTED MECHANISM OF THE COGNITION AND THE ORGANISATION OF THE ACTIVITY IN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY**

The understanding of the concept of security can be traced back to ancient history in people's cultures. An example of this is the Roman goddess Securitas. People believed she provided them with power against enemies, natural disasters, etc, as well as bringing them abundance. (Lyubker, 2007) This draws the focus of attention towards the fact that due

to the extended timeframe of the construct in people's thought and culture, it is complex to define what is thought of security – personal, state's, or the personal positioning, relative to the outside world. Especially in the second decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Along this line of thought, the work accounts for the understanding, gained corroboration in the past decades, that security is a state of stable and dynamic equilibrium, which can be considered specific. The latter is due to the circumstance that security has a purpose only for the person. (Yonchev, 2014, p. 27). Another specific, pointed out by the same author is that security is not a state of entities; it is a state of “complexes of interactions between entities” (Yonchev, 2022).

### **1.1. Cognition of the world and the systems in the context of security**

Due to the range of the so-defined understanding, the work proposes that security, and the associated human activity in particular, is associated with the active adaptation<sup>1</sup> of the individual to the surrounding environment. From an evolutionary perspective, the success of this adaptation depends on the level of achieved security. The reason is that the better people are adapted to the surrounding environment, the more secure they feel. As per C. Darwin's work, man adapts to reality through expanding their knowledge about it. It is natural to expect that the more in-depth the knowledge is – and it is a function of experience and thought (Kanke, 2008, p. 160) – the higher the level of the achieved security would be.

The active adaptation, however, requires a level of organisation and most importantly: an image, which people can create through their abstract thinking and which they can pursue by devising, setting, and accomplishing goals. As said by the American writer and political scientist Walter Lippmann, “He [the person] is learning to see with his mind (thinking) vast portions of the world that he could never see, touch, smell, hear, or remember. Gradually he makes for himself a trustworthy picture inside his head of the world beyond his reach.” (Lippmann, 1922, p. 29).


Relating the purpose of this image to security entails the scientific pursuit of the present development. In the context of the study following a systematic approach, it is impossible to omit referring to Goedel's Incompleteness Theorems. They describe the inability, in an uncontroversial (where it is impossible for one term to refer to two different things) and formal (where entities can be described) world, to describe a system with formulae of its own class (Vinogradov, 1977, p. 909). Regarding the systems in the context of security, Goedel's theorems suggest that the only viable way for the person to describe the world that surrounds them is for that

---

<sup>1</sup> After the discoveries of Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer, it is widely known that the person considers the surrounding environment, but also alters that environment, so that it is better suited, in this instance – safer, for them. Thus, for the person, the adaptation in nature signifies a specific ‘re-work’ of the environment, too.

person to ‘exit’ their own system and to use an apparatus of formal tools of a higher level, compared to the system in question. As to whether this is possible: both yes and no.

It is apparent that the physical separation of the individual from society and the state they inhabit is impossible, without them ceasing to be an element of the system. On the other hand, people are not simply elements, but conscious beings. Aside from distinguishing them from other species, this characteristic is associated with several benefits – one of them is thinking through abstractions. The present work raises the argument that one of these abstractions is the image of the world, which is shaped in the person’s mind. As far as security is concerned, this cognitively processed world is not only an image – it is a leading prototype which the person is striving to achieve. This is the leading image, around which people unite their activity and achieve the synergy, befitting the state and the society within it.



**Figure 1.** Creating of the cognitive image in the systems in the context of security (*original development by the author*)

### 1.2. Ideal, sought, and achieved security

This leading image around which people unite their activity, in the present work, is defined as sought security, and proposed is that the activity towards security can be provisionally divided as:

- Ideal – the state of equilibrium which exists in the world and to which the person is capable of getting close to, but not to achieve in its entirety;

- Sought – the state described in the prototype image, which ‘lives’ solely in the cognitive field of security;

- Achieved – the state of equilibrium, which people, through their activity or inactivity, achieve in the interactions taking place within the systems or between them.

The division is provisional, as the three selections are not independent from one another and can hardly have hard limits assigned to them. For example, the sought security is more or less shaped through past experience and future plans, but also through the knowledge developed in the studying of the term ‘security’ (or ideal security). Consequently, the border between the two types of security is present, but difficult to outline. The same applies to the achieved security. It is not a carbon copy of the sought security, due to the effect of a range of factors which the person is incapable of foreseeing: nature’s unpredictability, errors in expectations, etc. Beyond all else, the proposed interdependencies are dynamic. They change in the process of being assessed, relative to one another: by building the virtual world, based on the sought security, people learn an ever increasing amount about the ideal security; this knowledge is used to, in turn, adapt the image of the sought security. Another fact of life is that by working on the achieved security, the systems face hurdles. In response, they optimise and adapt the image of the sought security in the process of striving towards it.

### **1.3. Role of the communication**

As a specific social interaction, communication<sup>2</sup> plays an integral role in shaping the generalised image, i.e. the sought security, and from there – of the achieved security, too.

The proposed explanation in the present work is that the person is limited in their ability to sense the world and is thus perceiving it incompletely. As a result, the individual images, albeit a reflection of one and the same world, are incomplete and in some cases – inaccurate, or even incorrect. People overcome this limitation through their abstract thinking. They communicate amongst themselves, argue, exchange information, connect what is observed with their life experience, with others’ comments, with what they have learnt in their family, their school or university, as well as with their future plans. A system in the context of security is aimed towards this image, and its activity is measured against it. As long as it develops in the social system of the state and its society, this image is ‘put together’ in the process of social interaction, called communication. Consequently, it is logical to assume that it not only combines a relatively complete image of the surrounding world, but it represents the most accurate

---

<sup>2</sup> Communication is the primary component in interacting. In social psychology, interacting is defined as a basal social category which comprises three aspects: 1) perceptive: establishing a reciprocity in the understanding between the people interacting; 2) communicative: relating to the exchange of information; 3) interactive: organising the interactions (mutual exchange of influences). (Dzhonev, 1996, p. 11)

image possible – at least as far as human knowledge spans at the moment of creating the image. Organised this way, the approach exemplifies the merits of the assessment that the sought security is justifiably seen as a cognitive component in the system state-society.

The final aspect of the proposed model for organising the systems in the context of security is the super-systemic level. The states and their societies do not live by themselves, but in an intensive interaction of cooperation and competition<sup>3</sup> with the remaining societies, states, international organisations, etc. The specifics spawned by this parallel action are not only apparent, but they explain the emergence and the nature of tools, such as censorship, propaganda, and informational warfare, as well as their defining role for the activity which the systems show in the context of security.

## **2. TOOLS FOR GOVERNANCE OF THE COGNITIVE COMPONENT OF SECURITY. SUPRA-STATE SUBJECTS OF GOVERNANCE**

Logic shows that interventions in the processes of social relations, which connect the ideal, the sought, and the achieved security can deliberately sway state and society in a direction, pre-defined by someone else – a player who is either super-systemic, or is from another system.

Along this line of thought, the role of communication comes to the forefront. Thanks to it, the people in the system homogenise the images of their perceptions and develop a collective image which is a relatively accurate reflection of the world. As this collective image is, in fact, the sought security, communication is indeed a potent tool for affecting its formation.

In the context of the ideal security, it is not dependent on the individual, as the only thing they can do about it is understand it, and even that is to a point. Perceiving and transforming this information into activity is, however, affected by the communication with others, simply due to the fact people are social beings. As a result, interferences in the communication for the homogenisation of the individual images of the world become integral in the activity of the state and the society within it. At that, relatively quickly and bloodlessly. As a tool, communication is especially lucrative, as it does not require physical violence to alter the activity in creating the achieved security.

Another relevant circumstance is present – as social systems continuously develop and become more complex (Bourdeau, 2008), the systems in the context of security need to account ever more factors in the

---

<sup>3</sup> As mentioned by Sava Djonev, a researcher in the fields of Psychology and Social sciences, the connectedness between the people leads to an expansion of the interactions, in which the sought “benefit for one either forfeits the benefit for another, or it comes at the other’s expense. (Dzhonev, 1996, p. 56)

creation and homogenisation of the image of the sought security. It is natural to assume that the tools for governance of these mechanisms advance in their complexity too. It is possibly these two factors – the opportunity to avoid violence and the increase in complexity of the mechanisms – that lead to the increased attention that the people of the 20<sup>th</sup> and the 21<sup>st</sup> century pay to propaganda and informational warfare.

### **2.1. Censorship and propaganda**

Regarding development, apparent becomes the following correlation: In the Middle Ages Europe is split between kingdoms, duchies, etc. People do not travel so much, and wars are local. The soldiers do not get to meet peoples and states, foreign to their own. Starting in the 14<sup>th</sup> century and stretching to the 17<sup>th</sup>, however, the wars between Catholics and Protestants ensued – the Hundred Years' War (1337 – 1453) and the Thirty Years' War (1618 – 1648). Warfare took soldiers ever further from their birthplaces, often along with their wives and children. These relocations were inevitably associated with encounters with foreign peoples. Trade intensified (the farmer now knows they can sell their produce not only in their neighbouring land, but in the land, a few lands further out), stories and legends spread between lands, the technology to print with moving letters arrived<sup>4</sup>, etc. Knowledge exchange occurred on a broader scale and it started to have a reflection on the image of the sought security, which the soldiers built upon returning home. The Catholic Church in Rome took note and reacted to this development. It realises that, should the spread of printed issues be limited, the influx of knowledge from other cities and states will cease. As a result, the image of the sought security will continue to be formed according to the legacy models.

This view can be linked to the introduction of Index Librorum Prohibitorum – an index of the prohibited literature. It is created in 1559, under instruction from Pope Paul IV (Hilgers, 1910). This marks the formal introduction of censorship. From the perspective of the model for cognition of the world and for the building of the activity of the systems, censorship is visibly outlined as a tool for limiting the distribution of knowledge, which the people in the states have developed of the world.

The kingdoms, the duchies, the counties, and the people within them, no matter how far back in time, still develop and advance in complexity – like any social system. Only a century later, it turns out that censorship is insufficient as a tool, and thus emerges the propaganda. In 1622 Pope § XV creates a committee of cardinals, unambiguously called “Congregation for the Evangelization of Peoples” (Sancta Congregatio de Propaganda Fide). The tool is now more complex. From the perspective of the model from Figure 1, propaganda does not exclude censorship, but does emphasise on

---

<sup>4</sup> This happens in 1452-1454.


limiting knowledge, so much as on the modelling of the perceptions, responsible for the formation of the sought security. The modelling happens through narrowing the knowledge of the surrounding world and of the plans for the future; both achieved through a religion or an ideology.

Propaganda remains the leading tool until the end of the Cold War, i.e. to the end of the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The systems in the context of security, like every social system, continue to expand in complexity – especially after the abolishment of the bi-polar model of the Cold War, the ‘power’ that ideologies possess diminishes (Cooper & Flesmes, 2013). It is natural to assume that societies are ever more resilient to ideologically narrowed knowledge, which inevitably has an effect on the sought – and thus the achieved – security within the states, and in the world. The turn of informational warfare comes.

## **2.2. Informational warfare**

The reason for drawing informational warfare to the forefront is that in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, the person sees the benefits of the advancing globalisation and is not at all willing to give them up, in favour of outdated and backward models. The collision between necessity and resistance (often fear too) creates a favourable environment for the manipulation of perceptions and deepens the impact of informational warfare. This trend is known and a field of Security has already identified the necessity of orienting towards “the paradigm of informational security, the concept of the informational war, the shapes, the approaches, and the tools for applying violence in the cyber space; further, the doctrinal aspects of informational operations; the concept of the intercepting the informational war; and the role of the media in the realisation of the psychological forms of informational warfare”. (Bahchevanov, 2022) Informational warfare excludes neither censorship, nor propaganda. It puts the focus on the direct interference in: the processes of re-creating the strive towards security; the processes of modelling the sought security; and the process of seeking effects within the achieved security. Here, too, a considerable role is played by the communication, however, the emphasis falls on the comparison between reality and perceptions, and is clearly cognitive.





**Figure 2.** Tools for governing the mechanisms for establishing the homogenised cognitive image of the world (*original development by the author*)

The existing scientific developments on the matter show that informational warfare does not concern the primary control over communicational streams, but rather the cognitive manipulations exerted on society and the public opinion. As elaborated by Georgiy Pocheptsov, these interventions fall into the scope of Social Psychology (Pocheptsov, 2019). In 1999, Sergey Rastorguev – an analyst in the Institute of Informational Security in the Moscow National University defines informational warfare as a specific type of “hypnosis” for society and narrows down the action to the following sequence: weakening of society; imposing so that the only one heard is the intervening player of the informational war; separating the means for mass informing from the public opinion; pointing the focus towards external to the state and society events; instilling that the achieved is a success, but is also insufficient (Rastorguev, 1999, p. 105).

It is impossible to say whether informational wars can be aligned with the understanding for war from the 20<sup>th</sup> century. The answer is most probably not. The attempt to understand informational wars by going deep into their content and by taking into account a wider range of theoretical developments

shows that theory and practice in this area are incoherent. This is apparent in the American (Armistead, 2010), the Chinese (Coyer, 2015), and the Russian understanding of the matter. G. Pocheptsov even states that informational wars are highly unpredictable, while the tools used in them are varied and unclear (Pocheptsov, 2019, pp. 42-43). The understanding in the present work is that informational warfare entails misalignments, important for the scope, the direction, and the interference in security and relate to:

- The use of the word “war”, as there could hardly be any doubt about whether kinetic warfare is concerned;

- The governance: from whom, to whom, who the participants are, and what the aim of the informational war is. As exemplified by the example in the article, in the complexly organized societies of the 21st century, both the actors in informational warfare and the affected are not entirely clear, at least in the beginning of the intervention;

- Where these wars take place: in the global network of informational connectedness, or in the communication network at the foundation of the affected state;

- Recurring correlations: Could these be defined and to what extent, given the terminology is not fully established?

All these unknowns necessitate that any occurrences of informational warfare to be sought in a variety of dimensions, with one thing being apparent: any assaults on a state’s society happen through interferences with the public opinion.

The work offers a perspective for understanding the informational wars of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It aligns well with the concepts of the social scientist Niklas Luhmann. According to him, once created, the information continues to exist in the ocean of information, which surrounds people and their systems. This information sooner or later finds a receiver (Luhmann, 1986, pp. 266-269). As a result, the present work offers the view that in informational warfare it is justified to view information as an element, around which the systems in the context of security are organised. Viewed as a centre of attraction, the information does not depend so much on the possible rearrangement of the players acting in the knots of the network, as it does on the influence which could be applied on the data. The aim is for the affected party to convert the data to achieve the knowledge, defined by the actor as the appropriate one. The same knowledge, which later is to define the affected party’s activity and to shape the image of the achieved security.

### **2.3. Supra-state subject of governance**

When societies and states of the 21<sup>st</sup> century are concerned it is safe to assume they are considerably more complex than the ones from the Middle Ages – at least due to the natural rule for the development and the complication of the social systems. In the context of governance of the cognitive component of security, however, visible is the active role of the

actor, who controls the tools required for it. The said actor is also one level above the higher than the states and their societies, viewed as the primary building unit of the systems in the context of security. As a result, in the present work such actors are referred to as “the supra-state subject of governance”. In the countries of Central and Western Europe, along with their colonies, the role of such a supra-state subject of governance in the Middle Ages was played by the Catholic church. It is not a state in the traditional sense of the word, but even then – through the tools of the censorship and the propaganda – it imposes a model (an image) of the system, towards which the individual, the family, the communities ought to strive towards and realise. In essence, this is the sought security. It is apparent that the Catholic church of that time had understood the benefits of modelling the achieved security not through bloodsheds, but through working the mass cognition and thus – people’s activity.

Like a bizarre corroboration, a supra-state subject can be found in the third decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century too. The riots in the USA from January 2021 during the passing of the presidential power from Donald Trump to Joe Biden serve as a vivid example. Potentially unconsidered posts from D. Trump or his team provoked the people who had voted for him. The messages in question were multiplied through the social online networks and in Washington a crowd gathered, which subsequently stormed the Capitol. The situation was eventually put under control, but a not insignificant role was played by some of the leading actors in the cyberspace, who ordered moderators, administrators, and others to suppress D. Trump’s posts and some of the posts in favour of him. What remains is the question of who has the right to suppress statements from a present-day head of state. The answer is categorical that the decision for a suppression like this happens through pre-defined mechanisms, and in accordance with the social arrangements. It is widely known that such arrangements are not in place for the cyberspace. At that moment, the Bulgarian newspaper Capital published: “At that moment Trump was, perhaps, indeed a threat; however, the decision that followed was not for Mark Zuckerberg and Jack Dorsey to take.” (Zapryanov, 2021).

The names in the quote are not random. In March 2022, the famous entrepreneur Elon Musk bought the social networking platform Twitter. In May, while the deal is still not finalised, he states he will revert the suspension of D. Trump’s account – the suspension imposed after the Capitol storm the previous year. Musk also promises to dial back the regulation mechanisms in place and delegate this responsibility to AI-powered software robots. The intention is shared by J. Dorsey – Twitter’s founder and then-CEO. In November 2022 E. Musk revokes the suspension from D. Trump’s account.

### **3. AN EXAMPLE OF AN INTERVENTION IN THE COGNITIVE IMAGE OF THE SOUGHT SECURITY**

In an extension to the thought that today the cyberspace plays the role of a supra-state subject, a journalistic survey was conducted. From 4 independent internet addresses, located in Brazil, Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, an identical prompt was sent to the AI generative platform ChatGPT 3.5. The platform was chosen due to gained popularity exponentially over the past months. The instruction is for it to generate an essay on the subject of Yevgeny Prigozhin's biography. (Prompt: write an essay in 1 page about Yevgeny Prigozhin's biography) The prompt was sent by doctoral candidates from different nationalities, working in the respective countries. Due to the nature of the journalistic survey, the participants' names are undisclosed. All prompts were sent between 20<sup>th</sup> and 30<sup>th</sup> September – almost a month after the messages about Y. Prigozhin's death are released in the mainstream.

The subject was chosen, due to the active back-stage role played by Y. Prigozhin in Russian and world politics. According to issues like CNN (Tanno & Said-Moorhouse, 2023), BBC (Shevchenko, 2023) and TASS (TASS, 2023), his name is associated with a catering business, close contact with the Russian president, a media empire, paid trolls, and an alleged interference in the American elections of 2016. Furthermore, Mr. Prigozhin is considered to play a leading role in the private army “Wagner” and its participation in the armed conflicts in Ukraine and Syria, and his name is mentioned in the context of the international sanctions in response to Russia's actions in Ukraine. Over two months before the prompt was given – in June – due to misalignment with Russia's military headquarters, Wagner's soldiers, actively participating in the military actions in Ukraine, organise a revolt and reach Rostov-on-Don and Voronezh. On 23<sup>rd</sup> August 2023 Y. Prigozhin dies mysteriously in a plane accident.

When compared, the content of the answers generated by ChatGPT 3.5 indicates that some of the subjects outlined by the reputable informational agencies above are absent from the essays, generated in some of the countries. This result is of particular interest, as the matter of ChatGPT using information from reputable issues is well-known, especially since the New York Times is now pressing legal charges against ChatGPT's parent company, OpenAI, for utilising the newspaper's research to educate its AI algorithms. (Bradshaw & Miller, 2023) The results are summarised in Table 1 below.

**Table 1.** Accents in the content generated by ChatGPT 3.5(*original development by the author*)

	Bulgaria	UK Yevgeny Prigozhin: The Enigmatic Figure Behind the Shadows	USA Yevgeny Prigozhin: From the Shadows to the Spotlight	Brazil Yevgeny Prigozhin: A Controversial Figure in Russian History
Difficult early years of Y. Prigozhin	+	+	+	+
Time spent in prison	-	-	-	-
Catering business	+	+	+	+
Close connections with the Russian president	+	+	+	+
Internet Research Agency (IRA) and trolls	+	+	+	+
Interference in the 2016 USA presidential elections through paid trolls	+	+	+	+
International sanctions	+	+	+	-
Owner of Wagner	+	+	+	-
Operations of Wagner	In Ukraine, Syria, and Africa	In Ukraine and Syria	-	-
Plane accident and Prigozhin's death	-	-	-	-

What draws the focus of attention immediately is the fact that not all answers mention Y. Prigozhin's death. Considering the mystique added by the temporal proximity with the revolt of Wagner's soldiers, it is natural to assume that such omission in the coverage provokes the creation of conspirative theories.

Another accent could be placed on the absence of any mention of Wagner at all in the essays from Brazil and the USA, as well as on the omission of the fact Wagner acted in Africa in the essay from the UK.

The assumption that the cyber AI robots “observe” the habits and interests of the online users does not explain such omissions. It is difficult to believe that someone showing an interest in Y. Prigozhin would like to not know about his ownership of Wagner, or the operation of the army in Africa. What remains, however, is the doubt that a subject in the cyberspace manipulates the perception of the world and warps the resulting image. The questions are two: Who? and Why?

Whatever the answer, it corroborates the thought that in the cyberspace there’s an at least one supra-state subject of governance, and the omissions in the generated essays are not random, but an example of an intervention.

### CONCLUSION

The presented perspective gives reason to believe that in the informational space, where the systems in the context of security “live”, there is a cognitive space. With the development and the complication of the of the social systems, the mechanisms for operating in this field come ever closer to the main focus of attention. This necessitates a more in-depth look into the tools for governing these mechanisms. Informational warfare and the level to which it engages the attention of people in the 21<sup>st</sup> century is a corroboration of the increase in importance of such interventions.

The historical succession in the emergence of the tools for governing communication is interlinked with the development of societies and states. As a result, these tools grow in complexity and are used in unison; they do not perish and do not make one another obsolete – they build on top of each other.

In a peculiar light, the focus is drawn towards the supra-state subject of governance of the system in the context of security. The multi-century experience accrued in the systems allows for understanding the essence of that subject. In addition, it allows for uncovering the attempts for supra-state governance in the cyberspace too. These instances can be defined as challenges for the states and the societies within them in the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

### BIBLIOGRAPHY:

- Бахчеванов, Г. (2022). Образованието в професионално направление „Национална сигурност“ – организиран хаос. *Сигурност и отбрана*, (1), 31-42. <https://institute.nvu.bg/bg/statia/obrazovaniето-v-profesionalno-napravlenie-nacionalna-sigurnost-organiziran-haos> // Bahchevanov, G. (2022). Obrazovaniето v profesionalno napravlenie „Natsionalna sigurnost“ – organiziran хаос. *Sigurnost i otbrana*, (1), 31-42. <https://institute.nvu.bg/bg/statia/obrazovaniето-v-profesionalno-napravlenie-nacionalna-sigurnost-organiziran-haos>

- Виноградов, М. И. (гл. ред.). (1977). *Математическая энциклопедия*. Советская энциклопедия. // Vinogradov, M. I. (gl. red.). (1977). *Matematicheskaya entsiklopediya*. Sovetskaya entsiklopediya.
- Джонев, С. (1996). *Социална психология. Общуване. Личност*. Софи – Р. // Dzhonev, S. (1996). *Sotsialna psihologiya. Obshtuvane. Lichnost*. Sofi – R.
- Запрянов, Й. (2021, януари 15-21). Цензурирането на Тръмп е опасен прецедент. *В. Капитал*, бр. 2. // Zaprjanov, Y. (2021, yanuari 15-21). Tsenzuriraneto na Tramp e opasen pretsedent. *V. Kapital*, br. 2.
- Йончев, Д. (2014). *В търсене на сигурността*. Изток-Запад. // Yonchev, D. (2014). *V tarsene na sigurnostta*. Iztok-Zapad.
- Йончев, Д. (ноември 2022). Сигурна ли е сигурността? *Сигурност и отбрана*, (1), 7-14. <https://institute.nvu.bg/sites/default/files/inline-files/2022-1-01-yonchev.pdf> // Yonchev, D. (noemvri 2022). Sigurna li e sigurnostta? *Sigurnost i otbrana*, (1), 7-14. <https://institute.nvu.bg/sites/default/files/inline-files/2022-1-0>
- Канке, В. А. (2008). *Основы философии*. Москва Логос. // Kanke, V. A. (2008). *Osnovay filosofii*. Moskva Logos.
- Любкер, Ф. ([1914], 2007). *Реальный словарь классических древностей Фр. Любкера*. Санкт-Петербург – Москва Товарищества М. О. Вольф, 1888. // Lyubker, F. ([1914], 2007). *Realy nauy slovary klassicheskikh drevnostey Fr. Lyubkera*. Sankt-Peterburg – Moskva Tovarishchestva M. O. Volyf, 1888.
- Почепцов, Г. Г. (2019). *Информационные войны*. Киев Паливода, А.В. // Pocheptsov, G.G. (2019). *Informatsionnaye voynay*. Kiev Palivoda, A.V.
- Расторгуев, С. П. (1999). *Информационная война*. Радио и связь. // Rastorguev, S.P. (1999). *Informatsionnaya voyna*. Radio i svyazu.
- Armistead, L. (Ed.). (2010). *Information operations matters. Best practices*. Washington.
- Bourdeau, M. (2008). *Auguste Comte*. *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (Spring 2022 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2022/entries/comte/>
- Bradshaw, T., & Miller, J. (2023, December 27). *New York Times sues Microsoft and OpenAI in copyright case*. The Financial Times. <https://www.ft.com/content/23c15ce1-16c5-4b2f-804e-2c0da64e1972>
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O., & Wilde, J. (1998). *Security: a new framework for analysis*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.
- Coyer, P. (2015, October 13). *Chinese Information Warfare: Leveraging The Power of Perception*. Forbes. <https://www.forbes.com/sites/paulcoyer/2015/10/13/chinese-information-warfare-and-sino-american-rivalry/>

- Clark, D. D. (2010). *Characterizing cyberspace: Past, present and future (ECIR Working Paper No. 2010-3)*. MIT Political Science Department. <https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/141692/Clark%20%282010%29%20Characterizing%20cyberspace.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y>
- Cooper, A., & Flemes, D. (2013). *Foreign Policy Strategies of Emerging Powers in a Multipolar World: an introductory Review*. *Third World Quarterly*, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 34(6), pages 943-962. DOI: 10.1080/01436597.2013.802501
- Hilgers, J. (1910). *Index of Prohibited Books*. In *The Catholic Encyclopedia*. New York Robert Appleton Company
- Lippmann, W. (1922). *Public Opinion*. New York Harcourt, Brace and Company.
- Luhmann, N. (1986). *Ökologische Kommunikation. Kann die moderne Gesellschaft sich auf ökologische Gefährdungen einstellen?* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH.
- Shevchenko, V. (2023, June 25). *Yevgeny Prigozhin: From Putin's chef to rebel in chief*. BBC. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-64976080>
- Tanno, S., & Said-Moorhouse, L. (2023, August 28). *From Putin's 'personal chef' to rebel: Who was Wagner chief Yevgeny Prigozhin?* CNN. <https://edition.cnn.com/2023/08/23/europe/wagner-chief-yevgeny-prigozhin-russia-intl/index.html>
- TASS. (2023, June 24). *Prigozhin charged with armed mutiny, to face up to 20 years in prison*. TASS. <https://tass.com/russia/1637475?ysclid=loax3si3p8679092889>